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Abstract
The main objective of this paper is to define a logic for reasoning about distributed
time-stamped claims. Such a logic is interesting for theoretical reasons, i.e., as a logic
per se, but also because it has a number of practical applications, in particular when
one needs to reason about a huge amount of pieces of evidence collected from different
sources, where some of the pieces of evidence may be contradictory and some sources are
considered to be more trustworthy than others. We introduce the Time-Stamped Claim
Logic including a sound and complete sequent calculus that allows one to reduce the size
of the collected set of evidence and removes inconsistencies, i.e., the logic ensures that
the result is consistent with respect to the trust relations considered. In order to show
how Time-Stamped Claim Logic can be used in practice, we consider a concrete cyber-
attribution case study.
Keywords: Time-stamped claim logic, labelled deduction, Gentzen calculus, evidence
logic, cyber security.
1 Introduction
The main objective of this paper is to define a logic for reasoning about distributed time-
stamped claims. Such a logic is interesting for theoretical reasons, i.e., as a logic per se, but
also because it has a number of practical applications, most notably the ability to reason
about the attribution of cyber-attacks.
When reasoning about a cyber-attack, a digital forensics analyst typically collects a huge
amount of pieces of evidence from different sources. Some of the pieces of evidence may
be contradictory and the analyst might consider some sources to be more trustworthy than
others. Inferring conclusions from such evidence thus requires particular care and time. A
similar problem is faced by historians when they are trying to date particular historic events.
The Time-Stamped Claim Logic that we introduce in this paper provides the forensics
analyst with a sound and complete means to reduce the size of the collected set of evidence
and remove inconsistencies, i.e., the logic ensures that the result is consistent with respect to
the trust relations that the analyst considers to hold. More specifically, the Time-Stamped
Claim Logic is a monotonic propositional logic whose language contains assertions of different
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kinds: labeled assertions to expressing statements of agents about time-stamped claims and
relational assertions indexed by propositional symbols that are used to relate agents. In
particular, a trust relation with respect to each propositional subject is defined between
agents.
We formalize a Gentzen calculus for our logic, which allows one to infer a time-stamped
claim whenever (i) there is an agent that states the claim and (ii) each agent that is more
trustworthy with respect to the subject does not state the opposite claim. We define a modal
and many-valued semantics for our logic, and prove that the calculus is sound and complete
with respect to this semantics. In order to show how Time-Stamped Claim Logic can be
used in practice, we consider, as a proof of concept, a concrete cyber-attribution case study,
inspired by the Ukraine Power Grid Attack that occurred in December 2015.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we define the language of Time-Stamped Claim
Logic. In Section 3, we formalize a Gentzen calculus for the logic together with a running
example. In Section 4, we introduce the semantics, and we then prove the soundness and the
completeness of the calculus in Section 5 and Section 6, respectively. In Section 7, we apply
Time-Stamped Claim Logic to a realistic case study taken from the cyber-security area. We
discuss the most relevant related work in Section 8 and provide some concluding remarks and
ideas for future work in Section 9.
2 The Language of Time-Stamped Claim Logic
In this section, we introduce the language of the Time-Stamped Claim Logic.
Definition 2.1 Let P be a non-empty set of propositional symbols and assume fixed non-
empty pairwise disjoint sets XA and XT of variables, which represent agents names and time
points, respectively. The set KP of time-stamped propositional claims is defined as
KP = {−(t · p), t · p | t ∈ XT and p ∈ P}

Definition 2.2 The language LP of assertions is defined as follows:
• KP ⊆ LP ;
• t1 ∼= t2 ∈ LP whenever t1, t2 ∈ XT ;
• a1 Ep a2 ∈ LP whenever a1, a2 ∈ XA and p ∈ XP ;
• ∀x. xEp a whenever a ∈ XA and p ∈ P ;
• a : φ ∈ LP whenever a ∈ XA and φ ∈ KP ;
• a : φ ∈ LP whenever a ∈ XA and φ ∈ KP ;
• a :: (φ1, . . . , φn/φ) whenever a ∈ XA and φ, φ1, . . . , φn ∈ KP . 
Let us briefly discuss the intuitive meaning of these assertions:
• t1 ∼= t2 ∈ LP establishes that t1 and t2 are equivalent time points.
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• a1 Ep a2 establishes that agent a2 is more trustworthy with respect to p than agent a1.
• ∀x. x Ep a establishes that a is the most trustworthy agent with respect to statements
about p.
• a : φ establishes that a states φ.
• a :  t ·p establishes that there are no agents more trustworthy with respect to p than a
that state −(t · p). That is, each agent more trustworthy with respect to p than a does
not claim −(t · p). Similarly, for a : −(t · p).
• a :: (φ1, . . . , φn/φ) establishes that a states φ conditional to statements φ1, . . . , φn.
Given the relation of φ with respect to the other statements we will refer to a :: (φ1, . . . , φn/φ)
as a derived evidence. We will instead refer to the previous two assertions a : φ and a : φ
simply as evidence.
Let us now illustrate how our logic is used by means of a running example.
Example 2.3 Let us suppose that we want to model a crime situation C that possibly
occurred at time t in which there is a potential culprit J and some sources a1, a2 and a3
providing statements on the case. Let us further suppose that for the source a1 a person is
a culprit provided that person was at the scene of the crime, is capable of committing the
crime and has a motive. This can be expressed by the assertion
a1 :: (t · inplaceJC , t · capableJC , t ·motiveJC / t · culpritJC)
over P = {inplaceJC , capableJC ,motiveJC , culpritJC}. Moreover, we can write the assertion
∀x. xEmotiveJC a3
to express that a3 is a source recognized to be the most trustworthy with respect to knowing
the motive of the potential culprit J . Furthermore, the assumptions
• a1 is less trustworthy than a2 with respect to knowing the motive of J to have committed
the crime C,
• a1 claims that J does not have a motive to have committed the crime C at time t,
• a2 claims that J has a motive to have committed the crime C at time t
can be expressed in the Time-Stamped Claim Logic by means of the assertions
• a1 EmotiveJC a2,
• a1 : −(t ·motiveJC) and
• a2 : t ·motiveJC ,
respectively. Hence, if a3 does not have an opinion about whether or not J has a motive to
have committed the crime C at time t, then
• a3 :  t ·motiveJC and a3 : −(t ·motiveJC) should hold,
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• a2 :  t ·motiveJC should hold and a2 : −(t ·motiveJC) should not hold, and
• both a1 :  t ·motiveJC and a1 : −(t ·motiveJC) should not hold. 
Before we introduce the calculus of our logic, which will allow us to draw conclusions from
assertions like the ones in Example 2.3, let us define some useful notation. In the following,
we will write
varA : ℘LP → ℘XA
to denote the map that assigns to each set of assertions the set of elements of XA that occur
in it; mutatis mutandis for varT : ℘LP → ℘XT and varP : ℘LP → ℘P . We may confuse a
singleton set with its unique element. Given P ′ ⊆ P , X ′A ⊆ XA and X ′T ⊆ XT , we write
L
X′A,X
′
T
P ′ to denote the subset of LP including all the assertions using only symbols in P
′ and
variables in X ′A and X
′
T .
3 The Calculus of Time-Stamped Claim Logic
Let us begin by recalling what is a sequent and an inference rule. Let P be a non-empty set
of propositional symbols. A sequent over P is a pair (Γ,∆) and is denoted by
Γ→ ∆ ,
where Γ and ∆ are finite multisets of formulas in LP . An inference rule over P is of the form
Γ1 → ∆1 · · · Γn → ∆n
Γ→ ∆ F
where F is a set of fresh variables with at most a variable in XA.
For convenience, below, we will sometimes write
−−(t · p)
to mean t · p and vice-versa, in order to avoid the replication of rules NS, NK, SCR, SCL,
SKR, and SKL.
Definition 3.1 The calculus over P is composed by the following inference rules:
• Axiom (Ax):
β,Γ→ ∆, β
where β is of the form a : φ, t1 ∼= t2 or a1 Ep a2
• Cut (Cut):
β,Γ→ ∆ Γ→ ∆, β
Γ→ ∆
where β is of the form a : φ, t1 ∼= t2 or a1 Ep a2
• Reflexivity of ∼= (ER):
Γ→ ∆, t ∼= t
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• Symmetry of ∼= (ES):
t1 ∼= t2,Γ→ ∆, t2 ∼= t1
• Transitivity of ∼= (ET):
t1 ∼= t2, t2 ∼= t3,Γ→ ∆, t1 ∼= t3
• Congruence of ∼= (EC):
t1 ∼= t2, [a : φ]t1t2 ,Γ→ ∆, a : φ
where [a : φ]t1t2 is a formula obtained from a : φ by replacing t1 by t2
• Agent preference transitivity (AT):
a1 Ep a2, a2 Ep a3,Γ→ ∆, a1 Ep a3
• Agent preference reflexivity (AR):
Γ→ ∆, aEp a
• Agent preference congruence (AC):
a1 Ep a2, a2 Ep a1, [a : φ]a1a2 ,Γ→ ∆, a : φ
where [a : φ]a1a2 is a formula obtained from a : φ by replacing a1 by a2
• Agent preference maximum on the right (AMR):
Γ→ ∆, bEp a
Γ→ ∆,∀x. xEp a
b
• Agent preference maximum on the left (AML):
a′ Ep a,∀x. xEp a,Γ→ ∆
∀x. xEp a,Γ→ ∆
• Negative statement (NS):
a : −φ,Γ→ ∆, a : φ
a : −φ,Γ→ ∆
• Negative knowledge (NK):
−φ,Γ→ ∆, φ
−φ,Γ→ ∆
• Statement propagation over time (SP):
Γ→ ∆, t1 ∼= t2, a : −(t1 · p), a : t2 · p
Γ→ ∆, t1 ∼= t2, a : −(t1 · p)
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• Knowledge propagation time (KP):
Γ→ ∆, t1 ∼= t2,−(t1 · p), t2 · p
Γ→ ∆, t1 ∼= t2,−(t1 · p)
• Statement confirmation on the right (SCR):
b : −φ, aEvarP (φ) b,Γ→ ∆
Γ→ ∆, a : φ b
• Statement confirmation on the left (SCL):
a : φ,Γ→ ∆, aEvarP (φ) a′ a : φ,Γ→ ∆, a′ : −φ
a : φ,Γ→ ∆
• Extracting knowledge from statement on the right (SKR):
b : −φ, b : −φ,Γ→ ∆ Γ→ ∆, φ, a : φ Γ→ ∆, φ, a : φ
Γ→ ∆, φ b
• Extracting knowledge on the left (KL):
b : φ, b : φ,Γ→ ∆
φ,Γ→ ∆ b
• Extracting knowledge from statement on the left (SKL):
φ,Γ→ ∆, a : −φ φ,Γ→ ∆, a : −φ
φ,Γ→ ∆
• Conditional reasoning on the right (CR1):
φ1, . . . , φn,Γ→ ∆, a : φ
Γ→ ∆, a :: (φ1, . . . , φn/φ)
• Conditional reasoning on the left (CR2):
Γ→ ∆, φ1 · · · Γ→ ∆, φn a : φ,Γ→ ∆
a :: (φ1, . . . , φn/φ),Γ→ ∆
Most of the rules are self-explanatory, so let us briefly explain only some of them.
The rule (NS) states that the claims of an agent are not contradictory, in the sense that
an agent cannot claim φ and −φ. Observe that we do not have the right counterpart of NS
that introduces − in the right hand side. This is because the logic is not bivalent since there
is a third truth-value 12 . Therefore, − is not a classical negation.
The rule (SP) states that in order to conclude that an agent does not state a certain claim
at a particular time it is enough to show that he states the opposite claim at a different time.
The rule (SCR) states that it is possible to conclude a : φ when there is no agent more
trustworthy than a that claims −φ.
6
On the other hand, rule (SKR) states that in order to conclude φ, it is enough to show
that there is an agent stating φ that is not contradicted by a more trustworthy agent and
that each agent stating the opposite claim is contradicted by a more trustworthy agent.
We say that a sequent Γ→ ∆ is a theorem, written
` Γ→ ∆ ,
if there is a finite sequence of sequents
Γ1 → ∆1 · · ·Γn → ∆n
such that:
• Γ1 → ∆1 is Γ→ ∆,
• for each i,
– either Γi → ∆i is the conclusion of a rule without premises,
– or Γi → ∆i is the conclusion of a rule where each premise is a sequent Γj → ∆j in
the sequence with j > i.
In this case, the sequence is said to be a derivation for Γ → ∆ and Γ → ∆ is said to be
derivable.
The notion of derivable can be brought to the realm of formulas. For Ψ ∪ {α} ⊆ LP , we
say that α is derivable from Ψ, denoted by
Ψ ` α ,
whenever there is a finite set Γ ⊆ Ψ such that ` Γ→ α.
For the sake of readability, in the derivations that we give below we underline the principal
formula(s) of the rule/axiom that is applied.
Example 3.2 Let us return to the crime situation described in Example 2.3. Let P be the
set composed by the following propositional symbols: inplaceJC , capable
J
C , motive
J
C , culprit
J
C ,
divergenceJC , poor
J , friendJ , guiltyJC′ and similar
C
C′ . Let Γ be the set containing the assertions
• ψ1 = a1 :: (t · inplaceJC , t · capableJC / t · culpritJC)
• ψ2 = a2 :: (t ·motiveJC / t · culpritJC)
• ψ3 = a3 :: (−(t · capableJC), t · poorJ / −(t · culpritJC))
• ψ4 = a4 :: (t · inplaceJC , t · friendJ / −(t · culpritJC))
• ψ5 = a5 :: (t′ · guiltyJC′ , t · similarCC′ / t · capableJC)
• ψ6 = a6 :: (t′ · guiltyJC′ ,−(t · similarCC′) / −(t · capableJC))
• ψ7 = a7 :: (t · divergenceJC / t ·motiveJC)
• ψ8 = a8 : t · divergenceJC
• δ1 = ∀x. xEmotiveJC a7
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1 ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψ8, δ1, δ2 → a2 : t · culpritJC CR2:2,3
2 ψ1, ψ3, . . . , ψ7, ψ8, δ1, δ2 → a2 : t · culpritJC , t ·motiveJC CR2:4,5
3 a2 : t · culpritJC , ψ1, ψ3, . . . , ψ8, δ1, δ2 → a2 : t · culpritJC Ax
4 ψ1, ψ3, . . . , ψ6, ψ8, δ1, δ2 → a2 : t · culpritJC , t ·motiveJC , t · divergenceJC SKR:6,7,8
5 a7 : t ·motiveJC , ψ1, ψ3, . . . , ψ6, ψ8, δ1, δ2 → a2 : t · culpritJC , t ·motiveJC SKR(*)
6 b : −(t · divergenceJC), b : −(t · divergenceJC), ψ1, ψ3, . . . , ψ6, ψ8, δ1, δ2
→ a2 : t · culpritJC , t ·motiveJC SCL:12,13
7 ψ1, ψ3, . . . , ψ6, ψ8, δ1, δ2 → a2 : t · culpritJC , t ·motiveJC , t · divergenceJC ,
a8 : t · divergenceJC Ax
8 ψ1, ψ3, . . . , ψ6, ψ8, δ1, δ2 → a2 :: t · culpritJC , t ·motiveJC , t · divergenceJC ,
a8 :  t · divergenceJC SCR:9
9 b : −(t · divergenceJC), a8 : EdivergenceJCb, ψ1, ψ3, . . . , ψ6, ψ8, δ1, δ2
→ a2 : t · culpritJC , t ·motiveJC , t · divergenceJC NS:10
10 b : −(t · divergenceJC), a8 : EdivergenceJCb, ψ1, ψ3, . . . , ψ6, ψ8, δ1, δ2 →
a2 : t · culpritJC , t ·motiveJC , t · divergenceJC , b : t · divergenceJC AML:11
11 bEdivergenceJC a8, b : −(t · divergence
J
C), a8 : EdivergenceJCb,
ψ1, ψ3, . . . , ψ6, ψ8, δ1, δ2 → a2 : t · culpritJC , t ·motiveJC ,
t · divergenceJC , b : t · divergenceJC AC
12 b : −(t · divergenceJC), b : −(t · divergenceJC), ψ1, ψ3, . . . , ψ6, ψ8, δ1, δ2
→ a2 : t · culpritJC , t ·motiveJC , bEdivergenceJC a8 AML:14
13 b : −(t · divergenceJC), b : −(t · divergenceJC), ψ1, ψ3, . . . , ψ6, ψ8, δ1, δ2
→ a2 : t · culpritJC , t ·motiveJC , a8 : t · divergenceJC Ax
14 bEdivergenceJC a8, b : −(t · divergence
J
C), b : −(t · divergenceJC),
ψ1, ψ3, . . . , ψ6, ψ8, δ1, δ2 → a2 : t · culpritJC , t ·motiveJC , bEdivergenceJC a8 Ax
Figure 1: Derivation of ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψ8, δ1, δ2 → a2 : t · culpritJC
• δ2 = ∀x. xEdivergenceJC a8
and let ∆ be the singleton set with the assertion a2 : t · culpritJC . The derivation in Figure 1
establishes that Γ→ ∆ is derivable. The subderivation of (∗) is in Figure 2. 
We will show the use of Time-Stamped Claim Logic with a more complex case study in
Section 7.
4 The Semantics of Time-Stamped Claim Logic
In this section, we define the semantics of the Time-Stamped Claim Logic. In the following
sections, we will then prove the soundness and completeness of the sequent calculus with
8
1 a7 : t ·motiveJC , ψ1, ψ3, . . . , ψ6, ψ8, δ1, δ2 → a2 : t · culpritJC , t ·motiveJC SKR:2,3,4
2 b : −(t ·motiveJC), b : −(t ·motiveJC), a7 : t ·motiveJC , ψ1, ψ3, . . . , ψ6,
ψ8, δ1, δ2 → a2 : t · culpritJC SCL:5,6
3 a7 : t ·motiveJC , ψ1, ψ3, . . . , ψ6, ψ8, δ1, δ2 → a2 : t · culpritJC , t ·motiveJC ,
a7 : t ·motiveJC Ax
4 a7 : t ·motiveJC , ψ1, ψ3, . . . , ψ6, ψ8, δ1, δ2 → a2 : t · culpritJC , t ·motiveJC ,
a7 :  t ·motiveJC SCR:8
5 b : −(t ·motiveJC), b : −(t ·motiveJC), a7 : t ·motiveJC , ψ1, ψ3, . . . , ψ6,
ψ8, δ1, δ2 → a2 : t · culpritJC , bEmotiveJC a7 AML:7
6 b : −(t ·motiveJC), b : −(t ·motiveJC), a7 : t ·motiveJC , ψ1, ψ3, . . . , ψ6,
ψ8, δ1, δ2 → a2 : t · culpritJC , a7 : t ·motiveJC Ax
7 bEmotiveJC a7, b : −(t ·motive
J
C), b : −(t ·motiveJC), a7 : t ·motiveJC ,
ψ1, ψ3, . . . , ψ6, ψ8, δ1, δ2 → a2 : t · culpritJC , bEmotiveJC a7 Ax
8 b : −(t ·motiveJC), a7 EdivergenceJC b, a7 : t ·motive
J
C , ψ1, ψ3, . . . , ψ6,
ψ8, δ1, δ2 → a2 : t · culpritJC , t ·motiveJC NS:9
9 b : −(t ·motiveJC), a7 EdivergenceJC b, a7 : t ·motive
J
C , ψ1, ψ3, . . . , ψ6,
ψ8, δ1, δ2 → a2 : t · culpritJC , t ·motiveJC , b : t ·motiveJC AML:10
10 bEdivergenceJC a7, b : −(t ·motive
J
C), a7 EdivergenceJC b, a7 : t ·motive
J
C ,
ψ1, ψ3, . . . , ψ6, ψ8, δ1, δ2 → a2 : t · culpritJC , t ·motiveJC , b : t ·motiveJC AC
Figure 2: Subderivation of (∗) in the derivation in Figure 1
respect to this semantics. We start by introducing the notion of interpretation structure,
which has a modal and many-valued flavour.
Definition 4.1 An interpretation structure over a non-empty set P of propositional symbols
is a tuple
(DA, DT ,∼=I , {EIp}p∈P , V )
such that
• DA and DT are non-empty sets,
• ∼=I is a reflexive, symmetric and transitive relation over DT ,
• EIp is a transitive and reflexive binary relation over DA for each p ∈ P ,
• V : P ×DA ×DT → {0, 1, 12} such that for every p ∈ P , d ∈ DA and n, n′ ∈ DT ,
– if V (p, d, n) = 1, then V (p, d,m) = 0 for every m ∈ DT such that m 6∼=I n,
– V (p, d, n) = V (p, d, n′) whenever n ∼=I n′,
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– V (p, d, n) = V (p, d′, n) whenever dEIp d′ and d′ EIp d.
In an interpretation structure, V (p, d, n) = 1 means that agent d claims that p occurred at time
n, V (p, d, n) = 0 means that agent d claims that p does not occur at time n and V (p, d, n) = 12
means that agent d does not have an opinion about the occurrence of p at time n.
An assignment ρ over I is a pair (ρA, ρT ) such that ρA : XA → DA and ρT : XT → DT
are maps. Moreover, we say that assignments ρ and ρ′ are equivalent up to b ∈ XA, written
ρ ≡Ab ρ′ ,
whenever ρ′T = ρT and ρ
′
A(a) = ρA(a) for every a ∈ XA \ {b}.
Given an interpretation structure I over P and an assignment ρ over I, satisfaction of an
assertion α by I and ρ, denoted by
Iρ  α ,
is defined as follows
• Iρ  t1 ∼= t2 whenever ρT (t1)∼=IρT (t2),
• Iρ  a1 Ep a2 whenever ρA(a1)EIp ρA(a2),
• Iρ  ∀x. xEp a whenever dEIp ρA(a) for every d ∈ DA,
• Iρ  a : φ whenever V (p, ρA(a), ρT (t)) =
{
1 if φ is t · p
0 if φ is −(t · p) ,
• Iρ  a : φ whenever, for each assignment ρ′ and b ∈ XA such that ρ′ ≡Ab ρ, if
Iρ′  aEvarP (φ) b then Iρ′ 6 b : −φ,
• Iρ  φ whenever
– for each assignment ρ′ and b ∈ XA with ρ′ ≡Ab ρ, if Iρ′  b : −φ then Iρ′ 6 b :−φ,
– there are assignment ρ′ and a ∈ XA with ρ′ ≡Aa ρ, Iρ′  a : φ and Iρ′  a : φ,
• Iρ  a :: (φ1, . . . , φn/φ) whenever if Iρ  φi for i = 1, . . . , n then Iρ  a : φ. 
Note that in the definition of satisfaction the truth-value 12 does not play an explicit role.
However, it allows the following to be possible:
Iρ 6 a : φ and Iρ 6 a : −φ.
To simplify the presentation, given a set Γ ⊆ LP , we will write
Iρ  Γ
whenever Iρ  γ for each γ ∈ Γ.
Definition 4.2 Given Ψ ⊆ LP and α ∈ LP , we say that Ψ entails α, denoted by
Ψ  α ,
whenever for every interpretation structure I and assignment ρ over I we have
Iρ  α if Iρ  Ψ .

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5 Soundness
In this section, we prove that the theorems derived using the calculus of the Time-Stamped
Claim Logic introduced in Section 3 are valid according to the semantics introduced in Sec-
tion 4. We start by providing some relevant semantic notions related to sequents.
Definition 5.1 We say that an interpretation structure I and an assignment ρ satisfy a
sequent Γ→ ∆, denoted by
Iρ  Γ→ ∆ ,
whenever Iρ  δ for some δ ∈ ∆ if Iρ  Γ. We say that a sequent Γ → ∆ is valid, denoted
by
 Γ→ ∆ ,
whenever it is satisfied by every interpretation structure I and assignment ρ. We say that I
and ρ satisfy a rule with a fresh variable b,
Γ1 → ∆1 · · · Γn → ∆n
Γ→ ∆ b ,
whenever Iρ  Γ → ∆ if Iρ′  Γi → ∆i for i = 1, . . . , n for every ρ′ such that ρ′ ≡Ab ρ. We
say that I and ρ satisfy a rule without fresh variables,
Γ1 → ∆1 · · · Γn → ∆n
Γ→ ∆ ,
whenever Iρ  Γ→ ∆ if Iρ  Γi → ∆i for i = 1, . . . , n. Finally, we say that a rule is sound
whenever it is satisfied by every interpretation structure and assignment. 
The proof of the following result is in Appendix A.
Proposition 5.2 The rules of the sequent calculus are sound.
The soundness of the rules can be used to show the soundness of deductive consequences.
Proposition 5.3 Let Γ→ ∆ be a sequent over P . Then  Γ→ ∆ whenever ` Γ→ ∆.
Proof: The proof is by induction on the length of a derivation Γ1 → ∆1 · · ·Γn → ∆n of
Γ→ ∆. The base case follows straightforwardly by Proposition 5.2.
For the step case, assume that Γ1 → ∆1 follows from rule u of the calculus applied to
sequents Γij → ∆ij for j = 1, . . . , k. Then ` Γij → ∆ij for j = 1, . . . , k. Hence, by the
induction hypothesis,  Γij → ∆ij for j = 1, . . . , k. Let I be an interpretation structure, ρ
an assignment and ρ′ an assignment equivalent modulo the fresh variables of u to ρ. Then
Iρ′  Γij → ∆ij for j = 1, . . . , k since  Γij → ∆ij for j = 1, . . . , k. Taking into account that
u is sound, by Proposition 5.2, we conclude that Iρ  Γ1 → ∆1. QED
Capitalizing on the soundness at the sequent level, we can establish soundness at the level
of assertions.
Proposition 5.4 Let Ψ ⊆ LP and α ∈ LP . Then Ψ  α whenever Ψ ` α.
Proof: Assume that Ψ ` α. Then there is a finite set Γ ⊆ Ψ such that ` Γ → α. Thus, by
Proposition 5.3,  Γ → α. Let I be an interpretation structure and ρ an assignment such
that Iρ  Ψ. Therefore, Iρ  Γ and so Iρ  α. QED
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6 Completeness
In this section, we show that the Time-Stamped Claim Logic is complete using a Hintikka
style technique. We consider Hintikka pairs instead of just Hintikka sets since the logic does
not have a classical negation over all assertions.
Definition 6.1 A Hintikka pair over P ′ ⊆ P , X ′A ⊆ XA and X ′T ⊆ XT is a pair (ΨL,ΨR)
of sets of assertions in L
X′A,X
′
T
P ′ such that:
• either β /∈ ΨL or β /∈ ΨR for each β ∈ LX
′
A,X
′
T
P ′ of the form a : φ, t1
∼= t2 and a1 Ep a2,
• either β ∈ ΨL or β ∈ ΨR for each β ∈ LX
′
A,X
′
T
P ′ of the form a : φ, t1
∼= t2 and a1 Ep a2,
• t ∼= t /∈ ΨR and similarly for Ep,
• if t1 ∼= t2 ∈ ΨL then t2 ∼= t1 /∈ ΨR,
• if t1 ∼= t2, t2 ∼= t3 ∈ ΨL then t1 ∼= t3 /∈ ΨR and similarly for Ep,
• if t1 ∼= t2, [a : φ]t1t2 ∈ ΨL then a : φ /∈ ΨR,
• if a1 Ep a2, a2 Ep a1, [a : φ]a1a2 ∈ ΨL then a : φ /∈ ΨR,
• if ∀x. xEp a ∈ ΨR then there is a′ ∈ X ′A such that a′ Ep a ∈ ΨR,
• if ∀x. xEp a ∈ ΨL then a1 Ep a ∈ ΨL for each a1 ∈ X ′A,
• if a : φ ∈ ΨL then a : −φ ∈ ΨR,
• if t1 ∼= t2, a : −(t1 · p) ∈ ΨR then a : t2 · p ∈ ΨR,
• if a : φ ∈ ΨR then there is a′ ∈ X ′A such that aEvar(φ) a′, a′ : −φ ∈ ΨL,
• if a : φ ∈ ΨL then, for each a′ ∈ X ′A either aEvar(φ) a′ ∈ ΨR or a′ : −φ ∈ ΨR,
• if φ ∈ ΨR then either there exists a′ ∈ X ′A such that a′ : −φ, a′ : −φ ∈ ΨL or for each
a ∈ X ′A either a : φ ∈ ΨR or a : φ ∈ ΨR,
• if φ ∈ ΨL then there is a′ ∈ X ′A such that a′ : φ, a′ : φ ∈ ΨL and for each a ∈ X ′A
either a : −φ ∈ ΨR or a : −φ ∈ ΨR,
• if a :: (φ1, . . . , φn/φ) ∈ ΨR then if φ1, . . . , φn ∈ ΨL then a : φ ∈ ΨR,
• if a :: (φ1, . . . , φn/φ) ∈ ΨL then either φi ∈ ΨR for some i = 1, . . . , n or a : φ ∈ ΨL. 
We now show that for each Hintikka pair there are an interpretation structure and an
assignment satisfying all the assertions in the first component of the pair and not satisfying
each assertion in the second component.
The proof of the next result can be found in Appendix A.
Proposition 6.2 Let H = (ΨL,ΨR) be a Hintikka pair over P
′, X ′A and X
′
T . Then there
are an interpretation structure IH over P
′ and an assignment ρ over IH such that IHρ  ψ
for each ψ ∈ ΨL and IHρ 6 ψ for each ψ ∈ ΨR.
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The main objective now is to show that if a sequent is not derivable then there is an
interpretation structure that falsifies it. For this purpose, we must introduce the concept of
(deductive) expansion of a sequent.
Definition 6.3 An expansion of a sequent Γ→ ∆ is a (finite or infinite) sequence of sequents
Γ1 → ∆1 · · · such that:
• Γ1 → ∆1 is Γ→ ∆;
• for each i 6= 1, Γi → ∆i is a premise of a rule with conclusion Γj → ∆j with j < i and
all the other premises of the rule occur in the sequence.

Observe that every derivation is an expansion but not vice versa. From an expansion
fulfilling conditions described below, we will define an interpretation structure that falsifies
the first sequent in the expansion. We need first to introduce the concept of branch.
Definition 6.4 A branch of the expansion Γ1 → ∆1 · · · starting at sequent Γi → ∆i is a
subsequence Γi1 → ∆i1 · · · of the expansion such that:
• Γi1 → ∆i1 is Γi → ∆i,
• for each j > 1, Γij → ∆ij is a premise of the rule used in the expansion to justify
Γij−1 → ∆ij−1 (the conclusion of the rule),
• for each j ≥ 1 if Γij → ∆ij is the conclusion of a rule in the expansion then there k > j
such Γik → ∆ik is a premise of the rule in the expansion.
For simplicity, we present a branch as a sequence Γ′1 → ∆′1 Γ′2 → ∆′2 · · · instead of using the
numbering of each sequent of the branch in the expansion. When Γ′1 → ∆′1 is Γ1 → ∆1 we
say that the branch is rooted. 
Definition 6.5 We say that a finite branch Γ′1 → ∆′1 · · ·Γ′n → ∆′n of an expansion Γ1 →
∆1 · · · is analytical whenever it is possible to inductively define the families of sets
{(iL)j}j=1,...n and {(iR)j}j=1,...,n
such that
(iL)1 = Γ
′
1 and (iR)1 = ∆
′
1
and for j = 2, . . . , n,
(iL)j = (iL)j−1 ∪ (Γ′j \ Γ′j−1) and (iR)j = (iR)j−1 ∪ (∆′j \∆′j−1)
and if Γ′j → ∆′j is a premise of a rule u, then
1. either there is a side formula in the left hand side of a premise of u in the expansion
which does not occur in (iL)j−1 not involving fresh variables or there is a side formula
in the right hand side of a premise of u in the expansion which does not occur in (iR)j−1
not involving fresh variables;
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2. the non fresh variables of u in varA((Γ
′
j \ Γ′j−1) ∪ (∆′j \ ∆′j−1)) are in varA((iL)j−1 ∪
(iR)j−1) and similarly for varT and varP ;
3. the fresh variables of u in varA((Γ
′
j \Γ′j−1)∪ (∆′j \∆′j−1)) are not in varA(Γ′j−1 ∪∆′j−1)
and similarly for varT and varP .
An analytical branch Γ′1 → ∆′1 · · ·Γ′n → ∆′n is exhausted whenever each branch that results
from applying a rule to Γ′n → ∆′n is not analytical in the augmented expansion. An analyt-
ical exhausted branch is closed whenever the last sequent is the conclusion of a rule without
premises. Otherwise, it is said to be open. An expansion is open when it has an open
analytical exhausted branch. 
The proof of the next result is in Appendix A.
Proposition 6.6 Let Γ′1 → ∆′1 · · ·Γ′n → ∆′n be a rooted open analytical exhausted branch of
an expansion Γ1 → ∆1 · · · . Then (
n⋃
i=1
Γ′i,
n⋃
i=1
∆′i
)
is an Hintikka pair over varP (Γ
′
n ∪∆′n), varA(Γ′n ∪∆′n) and varT (Γ′n ∪∆′n).
Proposition 6.7 If a sequent is not a theorem then it has an expansion with a rooted open
analytical exhausted branch.
Proof: It is straightforward to see that every sequent has an expansion where all rooted
branches are analytical and exhausted. Furthermore, if all the rooted branches in that ex-
pansion are not open then the expansion is a derivation. QED
Capitalizing on the previous results in this section, we are able to establish the complete-
ness result at the level of sequents.
Proposition 6.8 If a sequent is valid then it is a theorem.
Proof: Assume that the sequent Γ → ∆ is not a theorem. Then, by Proposition 6.7, it has
an expansion with a rooted open analytical exhausted branch. So, by Proposition 6.6, there
is an Hintikka pair H = (ΨL,ΨR) over varP (Γ
′
n∪∆′n), varA(Γ′n∪∆′n) and varT (Γ′n∪∆′n) such
that Γ ⊆ ΨL and ∆ ⊆ ΨR. Hence, by Proposition 6.2, there are an interpretation structure
IH over varP (Γ
′
n ∪ ∆′n) and an assignment ρ over IH such that IHρ  Γ and IHρ 6 δ for
each δ ∈ ∆. Let I be an interpretation structure over P such that IH is the reduct of I to
varP (Γ
′
n ∪∆′n). Observe that ρ is also an assignment over I. Hence, Iρ  Γ and Iρ 6 δ for
each δ ∈ ∆. Thus, Iρ 6 Γ→ ∆ and so Γ→ ∆ is not valid. QED
Finally, we can show that the Time-Stamped Claim Logic is complete.
Proposition 6.9 Let Γ ⊆ LP be a finite set and α ∈ LP . Then Γ ` α whenever Γ  α.
Proof: Assume that Γ  α. Then  Γ → α. Thus, by Proposition 6.8, ` Γ → α and so
Γ ` α. QED
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7 A Concrete Case Study in Cyber-Attack Attribution
In order to show how Time-Stamped Claim Logic works, we consider a concrete case study
inspired by the Ukraine Power Grid Attack that occurred in December 2015 [11]. For the
sake of simplicity, we removed the references to the real actors involved in the attack and
substituted them with generic ones. A good part of the provided evidence will be similar
to the one found for this attack — we just carried out some simplifications for the sake of
understandability.
7.1 The Set-Up
We will denote the analyzed attack with PGA and its victim with U. We have 11 agents/sources
that provides information about this attack: SC1, SC2 and SC3 are three different security
companies; SD is the security department of an impartial country; SA1 and SA2 are two
sources with connections with country A; Ag is a well-known international news agency; NV
is a non-verified source; F1 is the forensics investigator hired by the victim; F2 is the forensics
investigator of company SC2; Bl is an analyst that writes blog posts related to cyber-attacks.
Furthermore, A is a country, and HG denotes a famous group of hackers.
For what concerns time, t′ is Spring 2015, t′′ is December 2015, whereas t is a more general
instant of time that can spread from Spring 2015 to (including) December 2015.
7.2 The Evidence
In the following, we list the evidence provided by the analyst. We start with the given evidence
and later provide the given derived evidence.
SC1 states that the IPs from where the attack was originated are geolocated in A (geoSourceIP).
SC1 : t · geoSourceIPAPGA
SC1 and SC2 both state that the used malware (usedMalware) in this attack (PGA) was a
version of the BlackEnergy malware, BE3, whereas SA1 states that the malware used in the
attack was not BE3 but KillDisk. The provided information holds as different attackers can
use different malware or pieces of software for the same attack.
SC1 : t · usedMalwareBE3PGA SA1 : −t · usedMalwareBE3PGA
SC2 : t · usedMalwareBE3PGA SA1 : t · usedMalwareKillDiskPGA
Source SC2 states that KillDisk was used during the attack, as it found traces of the KillDisk
malware when analysing the infected system. SD and SC1 both state that BE3 is similar to
its previous version BE2, whereas SA1 denies this statement.
SC2 : t · usedMalwareKillDiskPGA SC1 : t · similarBE3BE2
SD : t · similarBE3BE2 SA1 : −t · similarBE3BE2
Furthermore, at SD’s website is stated that BE2 is used mainly (usedBy) by a group of attack-
ers denoted by HG. SC1 states that HG targeted in the past mainly victims (targetVictim)
that have shown some form of opposition against A, its government, or its economical interest,
denoted by A Opponent.
SD : t · usedByBE2HG SC1 : t · targetVictimA OpponentHG
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Let us now introduce the evidence related the negative consequences of the attack PGA. SA1
states that the victim suffered from economical losses from the attack (econLoss), while
the news agency Ag states that the main losses were in reputation with respect to the
citizens (repLoss). Other agents like SC2 states that the damages of PGA were limited
(limitedDamage), whereas U states that this assertion is not true.
SA1 : t · econLossPGAU SC2 : t · limitedDamagePGAU
Ag : t · repLossPGAU NV : −t · limitedDamagePGAU
Further information were provided by the victim’s forensics investigator F1, which states that
he found, in the victim’s email server, phishing emails containing BE3, dated in Spring 2015,
denoted by t′. Furthermore, F1 states that in t′ there was a campaign of phishing emails
(spearPhishing) and the infection with BE3 happened through those phishing emails. SC2
states that BE3 is able to create a backdoor to the victim’s system. The statement about the
infection was also confirmed by investigator F2, who states also that the infection with BE3
did not happened by exploiting the Human Machine Interaction (HMI) vulnerabilities, and
this vulnerabilities were not exploited (exploitedVuln). This last statement is provided also
by F1.
F1 : t
′ · foundBE3phishEmails F2 : t′ · infectionBE3phishEmails
F1 : t
′ · spearPhishingphishEmailsPGA F2 : −t′ · infectionBE3HMIvuln
F1 : t
′ · infectionBE3phishEmails F2 : −t′ · exploitedVulnPGAHMIvuln
SC2 : t
′ · backdoorBE3U F1 : −t′ · exploitedVulnPGAHMIvuln
There are more information about how U was infected. In particular, SC2 states that BE2
infection occurs using HMI vulnerabilities, whereas SA2 states that BE3 infection did not
occurred using phishing emails. SC2 states that KillDisk is used by HG, while SA1 states
the opposite, and SA2 states that KillDisk is used by A. The news agency, Ag, states the
news about the blackout of the victim in December 2015, denoted by t′′, and that there was
a political conflict (polConflict) between the victim and country A in that period.
SC2 : t
′ · infectionBE2HMIvuln SA2 : t · usedByKillDiskA
SA2 : −t′ · infectionBE3phishEmails Ag : t′′ · newsBlackoutU
SC2 : t · usedByKillDiskHG Ag : t · polConflictAU
SA1 : −t · usedByKillDiskHG
Let us now introduce the provided derived evidence for this cyber-attack. The sources
provide discordant derived evidence with respect to the motives of the attack, whether the
attack had or not economical motives. In particular, SC2 states that attacker did not have
economical motives (econMotives) to perform the attack as there were not considerable eco-
nomical losses (econLoss) since the damages caused by the attack to the victim were limited
(limitedDamage). On the other hand, SA1 states that the attacker was pushed by economical
motives because it caused to the victim economical losses and reputation losses (repLoss).
SC2 :: (t · limitedDamagePGAU /−t · econLossPGAU )
SC2 :: (−t · econLossPGAU /−t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA )
SA1 :: (t · econLossPGAU , t · repLossPGAU /t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA )
There are discordant derived evidence also about how the attacker got access to the victim
system (victimAccess). SC3 states that the attacker got access by exploiting the HMI vulner-
abilities (HMIvuln), as during the attack the BE3 malware was used, and this is similar to
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1 ψ1, δ2 → t · limitedDamagePGAU SKR2,3,4
2 b : −t · limitedDamagePGAU , b : −t · limitedDamagePGAU , ψ1, δ2 →
t · limitedDamagePGAU SCL:5,6
3 ψ1, δ2 → t · limitedDamagePGAU ,
SC2 : t · limitedDamagePGAU Ax
4 ψ1, δ2 → t · limitedDamagePGAU ,
SC2 :  t · limitedDamagePGAU SCR:8
5 b : −t · limitedDamagePGAU , b : −t · limitedDamagePGAU , ψ1, δ2 →
t · limitedDamagePGAU , bElimitedDamage SC2 AML:7
6 b : −t · limitedDamagePGAU , b : −t · limitedDamagePGAU , ψ1, δ2 →
t · limitedDamagePGAU ,SC2 : t · limitedDamagePGAU Ax
7 bElimitedDamage SC2, b : −t · limitedDamagePGAU , b : −t · limitedDamagePGAU ,
ψ1, δ2 → t · limitedDamagePGAU , bElimitedDamage SC2 Ax
8 b : −t · limitedDamagePGAU ,SC2 ElimitedDamage b, ψ1, δ2 →
t · limitedDamagePGAU AML:9
9 bElimitedDamage SC2, b : −t · limitedDamagePGAU ,SC2 ElimitedDamage b, ψ1, δ2 →
t · limitedDamagePGAU NS:10
10 bElimitedDamage SC2, b : −t · limitedDamagePGAU , SC2 ElimitedDamage b, ψ1, δ2 →
t · limitedDamagePGAU , b : t · limitedDamagePGAU AC
Figure 3: Derivation of ψ1, δ2 → t · limitedDamagePGAU (see Subsection 7.3)
BE2, which usually infects (infection) the system by exploiting the HMI vulnerabilities. SC2
states that the access to the victim system was done using phishing emails (phishEmails) and
not through the exploitation of HMI vulnerabilities, because phishing emails were found in
the victim system, thus there was a spear-phishing campaign (spearPhishing), the BE3 mal-
ware was found in the phishing emails (found), and the system was infected by BE3 through
the emails. SC1 states as well that the victim’s system was not accessed using HMI vulnera-
bilities, as the system was not infected by BE3 through these vulnerabilities, and they were
not exploited (exploitedVuln).
SC3 :: (t
′ · infectionBE2HMIvuln, t · similarBE3BE2/t′ · infectionBE3HMIvuln)
SC3 :: (t
′ · infectionBE3HMIvuln, t · usedMalwareBE3PGA/t′ · victimAccessPGAHMIvuln)
SC2 :: (t
′ · spearPhishingphishEmailsPGA , t′ · foundBE3phishEmails, t′ · infectionBE3phishEmails/
t′ · victimAccessPGAphishEmails)
SC2 :: (t
′ · spearPhishingphishEmailsPGA , t′ · foundBE3phishEmails, t′ · infectionBE3phishEmails/
−t′ · victimAccessPGAHMIvuln)
SC1 :: (−t′ · infectionBE3HMIvuln,−t′ · exploitedVulnPGAHMIvuln/−t′ · victimAccessPGAHMIvuln)
The derived evidence provided by the various sources have discordances also for the starting
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1 ψ1, ψ2, δ2 → SC2 : −t · econLossPGAU CR2:2,3
2 ψ1, δ2 → SC2 : −t · econLossPGAU , t · limitedDamagePGAU (D1)
3 SC2 : −t · econLossPGAU , ψ1, δ2 → SC2 : −t · econLossPGAU Ax
Figure 4: Derivation of ψ1, ψ2, δ2 → SC2 : −t · econLossPGAU (see Subsection 7.3)
date of the attack. In particular, SC2 states that the attack started in Spring 2015, denoted
by t′, as in that period there was a spear-phishing campaign, the system was infected with
BE3 through the phishing emails, and a backdoor was created to the victim’s system. SA1
instead states that the attack started in December 2015, denoted by t′′, as the news about
the victim’s blackout dates to that period. SC1 contradicts SA1, by stating that the attack
did not start in t′′, as the infection occurred in t′, and the news about the attack spread in
t′′. SC2 states the same derived evidence as SC1, but based on the evidence that the attack
started in t′ and that t′ is different from t′′.
SC2 :: (t
′ · spearPhishingphishEmailsPGA , t′ · infectionBE3phishEmails, t′ · backdoorBE3U /
t′ · startedPGA)
SA1 :: (t
′′ · newsBlackoutU /t′′ · startedPGA)
SC1 :: (t
′′ · newsBlackoutU , t′ · infectionBE3phishEmails/−t′′ · startedPGA)
SC2 :: (t
′ · startedPGA, t′ 6∼= t′′/−t′′ · startedPGA)
The last discordance arises about the possible culprit of the attack. SC1 states that the group
of attackers HG is a possible culprit, as malware BE3 was used during PGA, which is similar
to malware BE2 that is used by HG. SA1 states that the possible culprit of the attack is
not country A, as the used malware was KillDisk and KillDisk is not used neither by HG
nor by A. Source Bl states that the possible culprit of the attack is country A, as there was
a political conflict in that period between A and the victim U. The attack was political, as
U did not suffer from economical losses and the source IPs of the attack were geolocated in
country A.
SC1 :: (t · usedMalwareBE3PGA, t · similarBE3BE2, t · usedByBE2HG /t · possibleCulpritPGAHG )
SA1 :: (t · usedMalwareKillDiskPGA ,−t · usedByKillDiskHG ,−t · usedByKillDiskA /
−t · possibleCulpritPGAA )
Bl :: (−t · econLossPGAU , t · polConflictAU, t · geoSourceIPAPGA/t · possibleCulpritPGAA )
Let us now introduce the relations of trust the analyst has with respect to the sources that
provided the above evidence. In particular, the analyst trusts: SC2 more than SA1 about
the economical losses of U from PGA; SA2 more than F1 and F2 more than SA2 for how the
PGA was able to infect U, (infection); SC2 more than SA1 for when the attack started; SA2
and SC2 more than SA1 about who has used a particular malware in the past; and SC1 more
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1 ψ1, ψ2, δ1, δ2 → −t · econLossPGAU CR2:2,3
2 ψ1, δ1, δ2 → −t · econLossPGAU , t · limitedDamagePGAU (D1)
3 SC2 : −t · econLossPGAU , ψ1, δ1, δ2 → −t · econLossPGAU SKR:4,5,6
4 b : t · econLossPGAU , b :  t · econLossPGAU , SC2 : −t · econLossPGAU , ψ1, δ1, δ2 → SCL:7,8
5 SC2 : −t · econLossPGAU , ψ1, δ1, δ2 → −t · econLossPGAU ,SC2 : −t · econLossPGAU Ax
6 SC2 : −t · econLossPGAU , ψ1, δ1, δ2 → −t · econLossPGAU ,
SC2 : (−t · econLossPGAU ) SCR:9
7 b : t · econLossPGAU , b :  t · econLossPGAU , SC2 : −t · econLossPGAU , ψ1, δ1, δ2 →
bEeconLoss SC2 AML:12
8 b : t · econLossPGAU , b :  t · econLossPGAU , SC2 : −t · econLossPGAU , ψ1, δ1, δ2 →
SC2 : −t · econLossPGAU Ax
9 b : t · econLossPGAU ,SC2 EeconLoss b,SC2 : −t · econLossPGAU , ψ1, δ1, δ2 →
−t · econLossPGAU AML:10
10 bEeconLoss SC2, b : t · econLossPGAU , SC2 EeconLoss b,SC2 : −t · econLossPGAU ,
ψ1, δ1, δ2 → −t · econLossPGAU NS:11
11 bEeconLoss SC2, b : t · econLossPGAU , SC2 EeconLoss b,SC2 : −t · econLossPGAU ,
ψ1, δ1, δ2 → −t · econLossPGAU , SC2 : t · econLossPGAU AC
12 bEeconLoss SC2, b : t · econLossPGAU , b :  t · econLossPGAU ,
SC2 : −t · econLossPGAU , ψ1, δ1, δ2 → bEeconLoss SC2 Ax
Figure 5: Derivation of ψ1, ψ2, δ1, δ2 → −t · econLossPGAU (see Subsection 7.3)
than Bl about who is a possible culprit of PGA:
SA1 EeconLoss SC2 SA1 EusedBy SA2
F1 Einfection SA2 SA1 EusedBy SC2
SA2 Einfection F2 BlEpossibleCulprit SC1
SA1 Estarted SC2
Moreover: SC2 is the most trusted agent about how the attacker accessed the victim’s
system, the economical losses, the economical motives and the limited damages; Ag is the
most trusted about identifying political conflict between entities; SD is the most trusted about
the similarities between malware and used malware in attacks; SC1 is the most trusted about
geolocating the source IPs of an attack; SC1 is the most trusted regarding the statement that
BE3 and BE2 are similar between each other.
∀x. xEvictimAccess SC2 ∀x. xEsimilar SD
∀x. xEeconLoss SC2 ∀x. xEusedBy SD
∀x. xEeconMotives SC2 ∀x. xEusedMalware SC2
∀x. xElimitedDamage SC2 ∀x. xEgeoSourceIP SC1
∀x. xEpolConflict Ag SC1 :  similarBE3BE2
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1 ψ1, ψ2, ψ3, δ1, δ2 → SC2 : −t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA CR2:2,3
2 ψ1, ψ2, δ1, δ2 → −t · econLossPGAU , SC2 : −t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA (D2)
3 SC2 : −t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA , ψ1, ψ2, δ1, δ2 → SC2 : −t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA Ax
Figure 6: Derivation of ψ1, ψ2, ψ3, δ1, δ2 → SC2 : −t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA (Subsection 7.3)
7.3 The Conclusions of the Analyst
In the following, we show how the analyst can use the Time-Stamped Claim Logic to draw
some interesting conclusions from the collected evidence.
Consider the following assertions:
ψ1 = SC2 : t · limitedDamagePGAU
ψ2 = SC2 :: (t · limitedDamagePGAU /−t · econLossPGAU )
ψ3 = SC2 :: (−t · econLossPGAU /−t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA )
δ1 = ∀x. xEeconLoss SC2
δ2 = ∀x. xElimitedDamage SC2
δ3 = ∀x. xEeconMotives SC2
.
We start by giving the derivation in Figure 3 of
t · limitedDamagePGAU
from the assumptions ψ1 and δ2. We can then show that
SC2 : −t · econLossPGAU
is derived from ψ1, ψ2 and δ2 as can be seen in Figure 4. The derivation in Figure 5 infers
−t · econLossPGAU
from ψ1, ψ2, δ1 and δ2. From ψ1, ψ2, ψ3, δ1 and δ2, we can also derive
SC2 : −t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA
as can be seen in Figure 6. From ψ1, ψ2, ψ3, δ1, δ2 and δ3 we can derive
−t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA
as can be seen in Figure 7. From
ψ4 = SC1 :: (t · usedMalwareBE3PGA, t · similarBE3BE2, t · usedByBE2HG /t · possibleCulpritPGAHG )
ψ5 = SC2 : t · usedMalwareBE3PGA
ψ6 = SD : t · similarBE3BE2
ψ7 = SD : t · usedByBE2HG
δ4 = ∀x. xEsimilar SD
δ5 = ∀x. xEusedBy SD
δ6 = ∀x. xEusedMalware SC2
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1 ψ1, ψ2, ψ3, δ1, δ2, δ3 → −t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA CR2:2,3
2 ψ1, ψ2, δ1, δ2, δ3 → −t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA ,−t · econLossPGAU (D2)
3 SC2 : −t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA , ψ1, ψ2, δ1, δ2, δ3 → −t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA SKR:4,5,6
4 b : t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA , b :  t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA ,
SC2 : −t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA , ψ1, ψ2, δ1, δ2, δ3 → SCL:7,8
5 SC2 : −t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA , ψ1, ψ2, δ1, δ2, δ3 →
−t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA ,SC2 : −t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA Ax
6 SC2 : −t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA , ψ1, ψ2, δ1, δ2, δ3 → −t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA ,
SC2 : (−t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA ) SCR:9
7 b : t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA , b :  t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA ,
SC2 : −t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA , ψ1, ψ2, δ1, δ2, δ3 → bEeconMotives SC2 AML:12
8 b : t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA , b :  t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA ,
SC2 : −t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA , ψ1, ψ2, δ1, δ2, δ3 →
SC2 : −t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA Ax
9 b : t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA ,SC2 EeconMotives b,SC2 : −t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA ,
ψ1, ψ2, δ1, δ2, δ3 → −t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA AML:10
10 bEeconMotives SC2, b : t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA ,SC2 EeconMotives b,
SC2 : −t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA , ψ1, ψ2, δ1, δ2, δ3 → −t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA NS:11
11 bEeconMotives SC2, b : t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA ,SC2 EeconMotives b,
SC2 : −t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA , ψ1, ψ2, δ1, δ2, δ3 →
−t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA ,SC2 : t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA AC
12 bEeconMotives SC2, b : t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA , b :  t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA ,
SC2 : −t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA , ψ1, ψ2, δ1, δ2, δ3 →
bEeconMotives SC2 Ax
Figure 7: Derivation of ψ1, ψ2, ψ3, δ1, δ2, δ3 → −t · econMotiveseconMotivesPGA
we can conclude
SC1 : t · possibleCulpritPGAHG
as can be seen in Figure 8. Finally, it is not difficult to conclude
Bl : t · possibleCulpritPGAA
from
Bl :: (−t · econLossPGAU , t · polConflictAU, t · geoSourceIPAPGA/t · possibleCulpritPGAA )
SC1 : t · geoSourceIPAPGA
Ag : t · polConflictAU
SC2 :: (t · limitedDamagePGAU /−t · econLossPGAU )
∀x. xEeconLoss SC2
∀x. xEgeoSourceIP SC1
∀x. xEpolConflict Ag
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1 ψ4, ψ5, ψ6, ψ7, δ4, δ5, δ6 → SC1 : t · possibleCulpritPGAHG CR2:2–5
2 ψ5, ψ6, ψ7, δ4, δ5, δ6 → SC1 : t · possibleCulpritPGAHG , t · usedMalwareBE3PGA SKR:6–8
3 ψ5, ψ6, ψ7, δ4, δ5, δ6 → SC1 : t · possibleCulpritPGAHG , t · similarBE3BE2 similar to 2
4 ψ5, ψ6, ψ7, δ4, δ5, δ6 → SC1 : t · possibleCulpritPGAHG , t · usedByBE2HG similar to 2
5 SC1 : t · possibleCulpritPGAHG , ψ5, ψ6, ψ7, δ4, δ5, δ6 → SC1 : t · possibleCulpritPGAHG Ax
6 b : −(t · usedMalwareBE3PGA), b : −(t · usedMalwareBE3PGA), ψ5, ψ6, ψ7, δ4, δ5, δ6 →
SC1 : t · possibleCulpritPGAHG SCL:9,10
7 ψ5, ψ6, ψ7, δ4, δ5, δ6 → SC1 : t · possibleCulpritPGAHG , t · usedMalwareBE3PGA,
SC2 : t · usedMalwareBE3PGA Ax
8 ψ5, ψ6, ψ7, δ4, δ5, δ6 → SC1 : t · possibleCulpritPGAHG , t · usedMalwareBE3PGA
SC2 :  t · usedMalwareBE3PGA SCR:11
9 b : −(t · usedMalwareBE3PGA), b : −(t · usedMalwareBE3PGA), ψ5, ψ6, ψ7, δ4, δ5, δ6 →
SC1 : t · possibleCulpritPGAHG , bEusedMalware SC2 AML:14
10 b : −(t · usedMalwareBE3PGA), b : −(t · usedMalwareBE3PGA), ψ5, ψ6, ψ7, δ4, δ5, δ6 →
SC1 : t · possibleCulpritPGAHG ,SC2 : t · usedMalwareBE3PGA Ax
11 c : −(t · usedMalwareBE3PGA),SC2 EusedMalware c, ψ5, ψ6, ψ7, δ4, δ5, δ6 →
SC1 : t · possibleCulpritPGAHG , t · usedMalwareBE3PGA NS:12
12 c : −(t · usedMalwareBE3PGA),SC2 EusedMalware c, ψ5, ψ6, ψ7, δ4, δ5, δ6 →
SC1 : t · possibleCulpritPGAHG , t · usedMalwareBE3PGA, c : t · usedMalwareBE3PGA AML:13
13 cEusedMalware SC2, c : −(t · usedMalwareBE3PGA),SC2 EusedMalware c,
ψ5, ψ6, ψ7, δ4, δ5, δ6 → SC1 : t · possibleCulpritPGAHG , t · usedMalwareBE3PGA,
c : t · usedMalwareBE3PGA AC
14 bEusedMalware SC2, b : −t · usedMalwareBE3PGA, b : −t · usedMalwareBE3PGA,
ψ5, ψ6, ψ7, δ4, δ5, δ6 → SC1 : t · possibleCulpritPGAHG , bEusedMalware SC2 Ax
Figure 8: Derivation of ψ4, ψ5, ψ6, ψ7, δ4, δ5, δ6 → SC1 : t · possibleCulpritPGAHG
and some of the above results. However, thanks to the trust relation
BlEpossibleCulprit SC1 ,
which says that the analyst trusts SC1 more than Bl for what concerns the possible culprit of
the attack, the analyst’s final result will discard Bl’s statement, and the analyst will conclude
that the possible culprit of the attack is HG.
7.4 Summary
In this case study, one of the forensics analyst’s conclusions is that a possible culprit of the
attack is the group of hackers denoted by HG. This conclusion was derived using the analyst’s
relation of trust, where the analyst trusts the security company SC1 more than Bl. Given
the set of evidence collected, our Time-Stamped Claim Logic allows the analyst to filter the
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conflicting evidence by using his relations of trust. This reduces the number of evidence that
the analyst needs to consider during the analysis phase. Furthermore, the set of evidence
that the analyst obtains in this way is consistent, as all the conflicting pieces of evidence are
removed (assuming that the analyst has provided all the required trust relations).
Our Time-Stamped Claim Logic provides to the forensics analyst with a sound and com-
plete means to reduce the size of the collected set of evidence and remove inconsistencies,
i.e., the logic ensures that the result is consistent with respect to the trust relations that
the analyst considers to hold. In other words, the logic uses the evidence and the derivation
of evidence of trusted sources together with the analyst’s relations of trust to remove the
inconstancies and provide to the analyst only evidence that is trustworthy (from his point of
view). Furthermore, the logic is able to provide to the analyst new evidence derived using
the given set of evidence. The derived evidence can be general evidence that is always true
or statements that sources have made and that the analyst trusts.
8 Related Work
In this section, we discuss the logics and approaches that are most closely related to our
Time-Stamped Claim Logic.
We begin by pointing out that there are a number of recent works on reasoning about
claims from different logical points of view, namely Justification Logics (see [4, 13, 8]), which
capitalizes on the Logic of Proofs (see [3]), Modal Evidence Logic (see [28, 27, 6]) and a logical
account of Formal Argumentation (see [9]). A recent work presents a paraconsistent logic able
to reason about preservation of evidence and of truth (see [10]).
In Justification Logics [4, 13, 8] propositional formulas are labeled with justification terms
built from variables and constants using several operations. The semantics is provided by
Kripke structures enriched with an evidence function that associates a set of worlds to
each propositional formula and justification term. Justifications in this logic are seen as
the strongest form of evidence providing a direct proof of the truth of an assertion.
More specifically, Justification Logics are enrichments of classical propositional logic with
assertions of the form
s : F ,
where s is a term and F is a propositional formula, meaning that s is a justification for
F . The operations allowed on the labels express the possible interactions that justifications
may have. The logic we propose differs significantly from Justification Logics since our main
goal is to address distributed time-stamped claims instead of justifications. Reflecting this
different goal, the labels in the Time-Stamped Claim Logic are an agent and/or a time-stamp.
Furthermore, our logic includes explicit constructions for expressing trust relations between
agents with respect to relevant evidence. On the other hand, Justification Logics may allow
nesting of labels which our logic currently does not support. Both Justification Logics and
Time-Stamped Claim Logic allow reasoning about labeled formulas and formulas without
labels. However, the relationship between these formulas is made clear at the meta-level in
Justification Logics, whereas in the calculus of Time-Stamped Claim Logic this relationship
is internalized.
The Modal Evidence Logic [28, 27, 6] provides a way to model epistemic agents when
dealing with evidence from different sources. It is a multi-modal logic that comprises three
modal like operators: one for representing that an agent has evidence for a formula, another
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for stating that an agent believes a formula to be true and a last one asserting that a formula
is true in every world. Neighborhood semantics is adopted.
An important difference between Modal Evidence Logic and our Time-Stamped Claim
Logic is that Modal Evidence Logic is not a labeled logic. Consequently, no explicit reasoning
about agents is possible in Modal Evidence Logic contrarily to what happens in our logic.
Moreover, in Modal Evidence Logic there is no specific mechanism for dealing with time-
stamped claims.
Formal argumentation has been investigated since the early 1990s but it was the landmark
work in [12] that started an abstract perspective on argumentation. A logic foundation of
formal argumentation was proposed in [9] using classical logic as well as modal logic to
characterize different extensions for argumentation. The main difference between that work
and Time-Stamped Claim Logic is that the former is related to arguments and the latter is
concerned with agent claims. So, naturally, there is an attack relation between arguments in
Formal Argumentation, whereas there is a trustful relationship between agents with respect
to a given subject in Time-Stamped Claim Logic. In both Formal Argumentation and Time-
Stamped Claim Logic, there are three possibilities for the valuation of both an argument
and a claim. Hence, both have three-valued interpretations. In Formal Argumentation, an
argument can be explicitly accepted (truth value in), explicitly rejected (truth value out) or
neither explicitly accepted nor explicitly rejected (truth value undec). In our logic, either an
agent d claims that p occurred at time n (truth value 1), or an agent d claims that p did not
occur at time n (truth value 0) or an agent d does not have an opinion about the occurrence
of p at time n (truth value 12).
Digital forensics techniques suffer from quantity and complexity problems [7] due to the
necessity to handle an enormous amount of pieces of evidence and to the low format of
the collected evidence. In this work, we proposed a solution that deals with the quantity
problem: Time-Stamped Claim Logic reduces drastically the number of given evidence using
the relations of trust of the analyst. Our logic allows the forensics team to decrease the
resources spent on the analysis, which is usually a human-based process, and to arrive to a
swift conclusion. Filtering the evidence reduces the chances of human error as the analyst
needs to deal with a considerably lower number of pieces of evidence during the analysis
phase.
The gathered pieces of evidence can be in conflict with each other because they are col-
lected from difference sources and because of the anti-forensics [16, 30] and deception tech-
niques [1, 2] used by the attackers to hide their traces. Digital forensics techniques are able to
deal with conflicting information [5, 14, 18, 20], but without taking into account the analyst’s
relations of trust. Our logic solves the conflicts by using in the derivations only trusted pieces
of evidence, thus providing as conclusions only consistent sets of pieces of evidence.
Filtering the evidence of the attack using the Time-Stamped Claim Logic helps the an-
alyst to swiftly identify who has performed the attack with a higher level of confidence. In
particular, the results of the filtering process can be used by the analyst during the attribution
phase [20]: the analyst can then deal only with trusted evidence and has a higher level of con-
fidence for the given result. Using this filtering process would reduce the resources and time
spent during the attribution phase, which is a crucial aspect of digital forensics investigations.
In [19], the authors have proposed another formal solution for filtering the evidence of
cyber-attacks. They introduced the Evidence Logic (EL), which is based on an enriched
Linear Temporal Logic and represents the evidence (simple and derived), the sources, the
reasonings, the instants of time, and the analyst’s relations of trust with respect to the
24
sources and the used reasoning. EL and Time-Stamped Claim Logic obviously share some
similarities, starting with the objective of providing security analysts with the formal means
to reduce the size of the collected set of evidence and remove inconsistencies. There are also
some fundamental differences, though. Most notably, EL is based on a monotonic-reasoning
procedure that rewrites the pieces of evidence with the use of tableau rules, but the rewriting
system and algorithm that govern the inferences lack a completeness proof. There are also
differences in the expressive power of the two logics. In particular, EL has a restrictive
constraint, where an evidence is either given or derived, whereas the Time-Stamped Claim
Logic is more expressive, as it permits one to represent the same evidence as given and derived
(for instance, in the case study in Section 7, the evidence econLoss is both given and derived).
The Time-Stamped Claim Logic permits one to better represent real evidence that can be
both given and derived by other evidence. Moreover, the Time-Stamped Claim Logic uses
in its reasonings only trusted evidence, whereas EL has a more credulous nature, where it
considers in its reasoning also the simple evidence used by the sources to derive new evidence.
There are differences also at the level of trust relations. The trust relations in EL are
binary relations between two different sources, whereas the Time-Stamped Claim Logic has
also universal trust relations, where a certain source is the most trusted for a particular
evidence (∀x. xEpa and a : φ). EL is able to represent the relation ∀x. xEpa by introducing
all the needed binary relations of trust (if there are a finite number of sources), but in case
new evidence is added, it needs to add new trust relations as well. However, EL is not able
to represent the a : φ relation.
EL represents the reasonings followed by the source to derive an evidence, as well as
the trust relations between reasonings. The reasonings can be applied by different sources
to derive the same conclusion, using the same premises. The Time-Stamped Claim Logic
does not represent the reasonings or their trust relations, instead, it uses the trust relations
between sources. The use of the reasonings and their trust relations in EL permits it to be
more generic, whereas the use of trust relations between sources for the derived evidence gives
a higher level of specificity to the Time-Stamped Claim Logic.
Finally, it is interesting to note that, for all these reasons, EL is not able to handle the case
study that we considered in this paper in the same way as the Time-Stamped Claim Logic.
In order to allow an analyst to derive the same conclusions we obtained here, EL would need
to undergo some changes which would come at the cost of losing expressivity.
9 Concluding Remarks and Future Work
We proposed a logic for reasoning about time-stamped claims by presenting a Gentzen calcu-
lus and a semantics, and proved soundness and completeness. We also showed how it can be
applied concretely to a case study in cyber-security attribution. There are several directions
for future work. The first is to provide automated support for our calculus (e.g., by imple-
menting it in a logical framework such as Isabelle or as a tableaux system) in order to avoid
having to carry out the derivations by hand. We also intend to investigate whether the logic
is decidable [24] and whether the logic has Craig interpolation [26]. Moreover, it would be
interesting to generalize the language of the logic in order to address other general claims as
well as to enrich the logic with dynamic features [29]. It also seems natural and worthwhile
to incorporate probabilistic primitives and reasoning in the logic [22, 21, 25, 17]. Finally, it
seems worthwhile to investigate the combination of this logic with logics addressing different
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aspects in order to obtain a logic with a broader applicability [15, 23].
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A Some Proofs of Sections 5 and 6
Proposition A.1 (a.k.a. Proposition 5.2) The rules of the sequent calculus are sound.
Proof: It is quite straightforward to see that the rules Ax, Cut, ER, ES and ET are sound.
(EC) Assume that Iρ  t1 ∼= t2, Iρ  [ψ]t1t2 and Iρ  Γ. When varT (ψ) is not t1 then ψ is [ψ]t1t2
and so the thesis follows immediately. Otherwise, if ψ is a : φ, then the result is immediate
by definition of I.
(AT) Assume that Iρ  a1 Ep a2, Iρ  a2 Ep a3 and Iρ  Γ. The thesis follows immediately
by the definition of interpretation structure since EIp is transitive.
(AR) Observe that Iρ  aEp a since EIp is reflexive.
(AC) Assume that Iρ  a1 Ep a2, Iρ  a2 Ep a1, Iρ  [a : φ]a1a2 and Iρ  Γ. When a is not a1
then [a : φ]a1a2 is a : φ and so the thesis follows immediately. Otherwise, the result is obtained
by the definition of I.
(AMR) Assume that Iρ′  Γ→ ∆, bEp a for every ρ′ such that ρ′ ≡Ab ρ and Iρ  Γ. Suppose
that there is no δ ∈ ∆ such that Iρ  δ. Then Iρ′  b Ep a for every ρ′ such that ρ′ ≡Ab ρ.
Hence, dEIp ρa(a) for each d ∈ DA, and so Iρ  ∀x. xEp a.
(AML) Assume that Iρ  a′ Ep a,∀x. x Ep a,Γ → ∆, Iρ  ∀x. x Ep a and Iρ  Γ. Then
d EIp ρA(a) for every d ∈ DA. Hence, in particular, ρA(a′) EIp ρA(a) and so Iρ  a′ Ep a.
Therefore, by the hypothesis, there is δ ∈ ∆ such that Iρ  δ.
(NS) Assume that Iρ  a : −φ,Γ → ∆, a : φ, Iρ  Γ and Iρ  a : −φ. We just consider
the case that φ is t · p. Thus V (p, ρA(a), ρT (t)) = 0. Therefore, Iρ 6 a : φ and so, by the
hypothesis, there is δ ∈ ∆ such that Iρ  δ.
(NK) Assume that Iρ  −φ,Γ→ ∆, φ, Iρ  Γ and Iρ  −φ. Then there is an assignment ρ′
such that ρ′ ≡Aa ρ, Iρ′  a : −φ and Iρ′  a : −φ. Thus we can conclude immediately that
Iρ 6 φ. Therefore, by the hypothesis, there is δ ∈ ∆ such that Iρ  δ.
(SP) Assume that Iρ  Γ → ∆, t1 ∼= t2, a : −(t1 · p), a : t2 · p and Iρ  Γ. Assume, by
contradiction, that there is no ψ ∈ ∆ ∪ {t1 ∼= t2, a : −(t1 · p)} such that Iρ  ψ. Then,
Iρ  a : t2 · p, that is, V (p, ρA(a), ρT (t2)) = 1. If Iρ  t1 ∼= t2 the thesis follows immediately.
Otherwise, ρT (t1) 6∼=I ρT (t2). Then, by definition of V , V (p, ρA(a), ρT (t1)) = 0. So Iρ  a :
−(t1 · p) contradicting the assumption.
(KP) Assume that Iρ  Γ→ ∆, t1 ∼= t2,−(t1 · p), t2 · p and Iρ  Γ. Assume, by contradiction
that there is no ψ ∈ ∆∪{t1 ∼= t2,−(t1 ·p)} such that Iρ  ψ. Then, Iρ  t2 ·p. We now show
that Iρ  −(t1·p) which leads to a contradiction. Let ρ′ be such that ρ′ ≡Ab ρ and Iρ′  b : t1·p.
Then V (p, ρ′A(b), ρT (t1)) = 1 and so V (p, ρ
′
A(b), ρT (t2)) = 0 since ρT (t1) 6∼=I ρT (t2). Hence,
Iρ′  b : −(t2 · p). Then Iρ′ 6 b : −(t2 · p) by definition of Iρ  t2 · p. Therefore, there is
ρ′′ ≡Ab′ ρ′ such that Iρ′′  b Ep b′ and Iρ′′  b′ : t2 · p. Then V (p, ρ′′A(b′), ρT (t2)) = 1 and so
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V (p, ρ′′A(b
′), ρT (t1)) = 0. Thus, Iρ′′  b′ : −(t1 ·p) and so Iρ′ 6 b :  t1 ·p. With respect to the
other condition, since Iρ  t2 · p, let ρ′ ≡Aa ρ be such that Iρ′  a : t2 · p and Iρ′  a :  t2 · p.
Thus Iρ′  a : −(t1 · p). It remains to show that Iρ′  a : −(t1 · p). Let ρ′′ ≡Ab ρ′ be such
that Iρ′′  aEp b. Thus, Iρ′′ 6 b : −(t2 · p). Hence, Iρ′′ 6 b : t1 · p.
(SCR) Assume that Iρ′  b : −φ, a EvarP (φ) b,Γ → ∆ for every ρ′ such that ρ′ ≡Ab ρ, Iρ  Γ
and that there is no δ ∈ ∆ such that Iρ  δ. We now show that Iρ  a : φ. Let σ be such
that σ ≡Ab ρ and Iσ  aEvarP (φ) b. Observe that Iσ  b : φ, aEvarP (φ) b,Γ→ ∆, Iσ  Γ and
there is no δ ∈ ∆ such that Iσ  δ. Then Iσ 6 b : −φ.
(SCL) Assume that Iρ  a : φ,Γ → ∆, a EvarP (φ) a′, Iρ  a : φ,Γ → ∆, a′ : −φ, Iρ  Γ
and Iρ  a : φ. Suppose, by contradiction, that there is no δ ∈ ∆ such that Iρ  δ. Then
Iρ  aEvarP (φ) a′ and Iρ  a′ : −φ. These facts contradict the hypothesis that Iρ  a : φ.
(SKR) Assume that Iρ′  b : −φ, b : −φ,Γ → ∆ for every ρ′ ≡Ab ρ, Iρ  Γ → ∆, φ, a : φ,
Iρ  Γ → ∆, φ, a : φ and Iρ  Γ. Assume, by contradiction, that there is no ψ ∈ ∆ ∪ {φ}
such that Iρ  ψ. Then Iρ  a : φ and Iρ  a : φ. We now show that Iρ  φ leading
to a contradiction. Let σ ≡Ab ρ be such that Iσ  b : −φ. Taking ρ′ as σ, by hypothesis,
Iσ 6 b : −φ. With respect to the second condition it is enough to take ρ′ as ρ.
(KL) Assume that Iρ′  b : φ, b : φ,Γ→ ∆ for every ρ′ ≡Ab ρ, Iρ  Γ and Iρ  φ. Assume,
by contradiction, that there is no δ ∈ ∆ such that Iρ  δ. Then, for every ρ′ ≡Ab ρ either
Iρ′ 6 b : φ or Iρ′ 6 b : φ. Since Iρ  φ then there is σ′ ≡Aa ρ such that Iσ′  a : φ and
Iσ′  a : φ which contradicts the facts above.
(SKL) Assume that Iρ  φ,Γ → ∆, a : −φ, Iρ  φ,Γ → ∆, a : −φ, ρ  Γ and Iρ  φ.
Assume, by contradiction, that there is no δ ∈ ∆ such that Iρ  δ. Thus Iρ  a : −φ and
Iρ  a : −φ contradicting the fact that Iρ  φ.
(CR1) Assume that Iρ  φ1, . . . , φn,Γ → ∆, a :: φ and Iρ  Γ. If there is no δ ∈ ∆ such
that Iρ  δ then Iρ  a : φ and so the thesis follows by definition.
(CR2) Assume that Iρ  Γ → ∆, φi for i = 1, . . . , n, Iρ  a : φ,Γ → ∆, Iρ  Γ and
Iρ  a :: (φ1, . . . , φn/φ). Suppose, by contradiction, that there is no δ ∈ ∆ such that Iρ  δ.
Hence, Iρ 6 a : φ. Moreover, Iρ  φi for i = 1, . . . , n. So, by hypothesis, Iρ  a : φ which is
a contradiction. QED
Proposition A.2 (a.k.a. Proposition 6.2) Let H = (ΨL,ΨR) be a Hintikka pair over P
′,
X ′A and X
′
T . Then there are an interpretation structure IH over P
′ and an assignment ρ over
IH such that IHρ  ψ for each ψ ∈ ΨL and IHρ 6 ψ for each ψ ∈ ΨR.
Proof: Let H = (ΨL,ΨR) be a Hintikka pair. Consider the interpretation structure IH over
P ′ defined as follows:
• the domain DA is X ′A, that is, varA(ΨL ∪ΨR),
• the domain DT is X ′T , that is, varT (ΨL ∪ΨR),
• (t1, t2) ∈ ∼=IH iff t1 ∼= t2 ∈ ΨL,
• (a1, a2) ∈ EIHp iff a1 Ep a2 ∈ ΨL,
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• V (p, a, t) =

1 if a : t · p ∈ ΨL
0 if a : −(t · p) ∈ ΨL
1
2 otherwise.
Consider also an assignment ρ such that ρA and ρT are identities. We show that for every
ψ ∈ LX′A,X′TP ′ we have
ψ ∈ ΨL implies IHρ  ψ and ψ ∈ ΨR implies IHρ 6 ψ .
1. ψ is t1 ∼= t2.
(a) Assume that t1 ∼= t2 ∈ ΨL. Then (t1, t2) ∈ ∼=IH and so IHρ  t1 ∼= t2.
(b) Assume that t1 ∼= t2 ∈ ΨR. Then (t1, t2) ∈ ∼=IH and so IHρ 6 t1 ∼= t2.
2. ψ is a1 Ep a2.
(a) Assume that a1 Ep a2 ∈ ΨL. Then (a1, a2) ∈ EIHp and so IHρ  a1 Ep a2.
(b) Assume that a1 Ep a2 ∈ ΨR. Then (a1, a2) /∈ EIHp and so IHρ 6 a1 Ep a2.
3. ψ is ∀x. xEp a.
(a) Assume that ∀x. x Ep a ∈ ΨL. Then for each a1 ∈ X ′A we have a1 Ep a ∈ ΨL.
Hence, IHρ  a1 Ep a for each a1 ∈ DA and so Iρ  ∀x. xEp a.
(b) Assume that ∀x. x Ep a ∈ ΨR. Then there is a′ ∈ X ′A such that a′ Ep a ∈ ΨR.
Therefore, Iρ 6 a′Ep and so Iρ 6 ∀x. xEp a.
4. ψ is a : t · p.
(a) Assume that a : t · p ∈ ΨL. Then V (p, a, t) = 1 and IHρ  a : t · p.
(b) Assume that a : t · p ∈ ΨR. Then V (p, a, t) ∈ {0, 12} and so IHρ 6 a : t · p.
5. ψ is a : −(t · p).
(a) Assume that a : −(t · p) ∈ ΨL. Then V (p, a, t) = 0. Hence IHρ  a : −(t · p).
(b) Assume that a : −(t · p) ∈ ΨR. Then V (p, a, t) ∈ {1, 12} and so IHρ 6 a : −(t · p).
6. ψ is a : φ.
(a) Assume that a : φ ∈ ΨL. Then, for each a′ ∈ X ′A either a Evar(φ) a′ ∈ ΨR
or a′ : −φ ∈ ΨR. Hence, by the induction hypothesis, for each a′ ∈ X ′A either
IHρ 6 aEvar(φ)a′ or IHρ 6 a′ : −φ. Hence for each a′ ∈ X ′A if IHρ  aEvar(φ)a′ then
IHρ 6 a′ : −φ. Let ρ′ be an assignment such that ρ′ ≡A′b ρ and IHρ′  aEvar(φ) b.
Thus IHρ  aEvar(φ) ρ′(b). Therefore, IHρ 6 ρ′(b) : −φ and so IHρ′ 6 b : −φ.
(b) Assume that a : φ ∈ ΨR. Then there is a′ ∈ X ′A such that aEvar(φ) a′, a′ : −φ ∈
ΨL. So, by the induction hypothesis, there is a
′ ∈ X ′A such that IHρ  aEvar(φ) a′
and IHρ  a′ : −φ. Let ρ′ ≡A′b ρ be such that ρ′(b) = a′. Then IHρ′  a Evar(φ) b
and IHρ
′  b : −φ. Therefore, Iρ 6 a : φ.
7. ψ is φ ∈ KP .
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(a) Assume that φ ∈ ΨL. Then there is a′ ∈ X ′A such that a′ : φ, a′ : φ ∈ ΨL and
for every a ∈ X ′A either a : −φ ∈ ΨR or a : −φ ∈ ΨR. Thus, by the induction
hypothesis, there is a′ ∈ X ′A such that IHρ  a′ : φ and IHρ  a′ : φ and
for each a ∈ X ′A either IHρ 6 a : −φ or IHρ 6 a : −φ. We now show that
IHρ  φ. Let ρ′ ≡A′b ρ be such that IHρ′  b : −φ. Then IHρ  ρ′(b) : −φ.
Hence IHρ 6 ρ′(b) : −φ, by hypothesis. Therefore IHρ′ 6 b : −φ. The other
condition follows straightforwardly taking into account one of the assumptions.
(b) Assume that φ ∈ ΨR. Then either there exists a′ ∈ X ′A such that a′ : −φ, a′ :−φ ∈ ΨL or for each a ∈ X ′A either a : φ ∈ ΨR or a : φ ∈ ΨR. Hence, by
the induction hypothesis, either there exists a′ ∈ X ′A such that IHρ  a′ : −φ and
IHρ  a′ : −φ or for each a ∈ X ′A either IHρ 6 a : φ or IHρ 6 a : φ. We
now show that IHρ 6 φ. Assume that for each assignment ρ′ such that ρ′ ≡Ab ρ,
if IHρ
′  b : −φ then IHρ′ 6 b : −φ. Then for each a ∈ X ′A either IHρ 6 a : φ
or IHρ 6 a : φ. Then for each ρ′ such that ρ′ ≡Aa ρ and IHρ′  a : φ we have
IHρ
′ 6 a : φ.
8. ψ is a :: (φ1, . . . , φn/φ).
(a) Assume that a :: (φ1, . . . , φn/φ) ∈ ΨL. Then either φi ∈ ΨR for some i = 1, . . . , n
or a : φ ∈ ΨL. Then, by the induction hypothesis, either IHρ 6 φi for some
i = 1, . . . , n or IHρ  a : φ. Therefore, IHρ  a :: (φ1, . . . , φn/φ).
(b) Assume that a :: (φ1, . . . , φn/φ) ∈ ΨR. Then if φ1, . . . , φn ∈ ΦL then a : φ ∈ ΨR.
So, by the induction hypothesis, if IHρ  φ1, · · · , Iρ  φn then IHρ 6 a : φ. Hence,
IHρ 6 a :: (φ1, . . . , φn/φ).
QED
Proposition A.3 (a.k.a. Proposition 6.6) Let Γ′1 → ∆′1 · · ·Γ′n → ∆′n be a rooted open
analytical exhausted branch of an expansion Γ1 → ∆1 · · · . Then(
n⋃
i=1
Γ′i,
n⋃
i=1
∆′i
)
is an Hintikka pair over varP (Γ
′
n ∪∆′n), varA(Γ′n ∪∆′n) and varT (Γ′n ∪∆′n).
Proof: In the sequel, we denote by ΨL and ΨR the left and the right hand side of the pair.
We now show that this pair fullfils the conditions to be a Hintikka pair:
1. Either β /∈ ΨL or β /∈ ΨR where β is of the form a : φ, t1 ∼= t2 and a1 Ep a2. Assume
by contradiction that β ∈ ΨL and β ∈ ΨR. Hence, there are 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n such that
β ∈ Γ′i and β ∈ ∆′j . Observe that any rule preserves β. Therefore, β ∈ Γ′n ∩∆′n and so
Γ′n → ∆′n is an axiom contradicting the hypothesis that the branch is open.
2. Either β ∈ ΨL or β ∈ ΨR where β is of the form a : φ, t1 ∼= t2 and a1 Ep a2. Assume,
by contradiction, that β is not in ΨL ∪ ΨR. Consider the branch Γ′1 → ∆′1 · · ·Γ′n →
∆′n Γ′n → ∆′n, β using the cut rule in the last step. Observe that this branch is still
analytical. Indeed β does not occur in (iR)n and no fresh variables are involved. Hence
we get a contradiction since the given branch is analytical and exhausted.
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3. t ∼= t /∈ ΨR. Immediate by rule (ER) since the branch is open. Similarly for Ep
4. If t1 ∼= t2 ∈ ΨL then t2 ∼= t1 /∈ ΨR. Suppose that t1 ∼= t2 ∈ ΨL. Then if t2 ∼= t1 ∈ ΨR
we could conclude that the branch was not open using rule (ES).
5. If t1 ∼= t2, t2 ∼= t3 ∈ ΨL then t1 ∼= t3 /∈ ΨR and similarly for Ep. Suppose that
t1 ∼= t2, t2 ∼= t3 ∈ ΨL. Then if t1 ∼= t3 ∈ ΨR we could conclude that the branch was not
open using rule (ET).
6. If t1 ∼= t2, [a : φ]t1t2 ∈ ΨL then a : φ /∈ ΨR. Suppose that t1 ∼= t2, [a : φ]t1t2 ∈ ΨL. Then if
a : φ ∈ ΨR we could conclude that the branch was not open using rule (EC).
7. If a1 Ep a2, a2 Ep a1, [a : φ]a1a2 ∈ ΨL then a : φ /∈ ΨR. The proof is similar to the one of
(6).
8. If ∀x. x Ep a ∈ ΨR then there is a′ ∈ X ′A such that a′ Ep a ∈ ΨR. Assume that
∀x. x Ep a ∈ ΨR. Suppose, by contradiction, that for every a′ ∈ X ′A, a′ Ep a /∈ ΨR.
Then, rule (AMR) was not applied to ∀x. xEp a and so ∀x. xEp a ∈ ∆′n. Consider the
branch Γ′1 → ∆′1 · · ·Γ′n → ∆′n Γ′n → (∆′n \ {∀x. xEp a}), bEp a using in the last step the
rule (AMR) where b is not in Γ′n ∪∆′n. Observe that this branch is still analytical. So
the original branch is not exhausted which contradicts the hypothesis.
9. If ∀x. xEp a ∈ ΨL then a1 Ep a ∈ ΨL for each a1 ∈ X ′A. Assume that ∀x. xEp a ∈ ΨL.
Suppose, by contradiction, that there is a1 ∈ X ′A such that a1Ep a /∈ ΨL. Observe that
∀x. xEp a is in Γ′n. Consider the branch Γ′1 → ∆′1 · · ·Γ′n → ∆′n a1 Ep a,Γ′n → ∆′n using
in the last step the rule (AML). Observe that this branch is still analytical. So the
original branch is not exhausted which contradicts the hypothesis.
10. If a : φ ∈ ΨL then a : −φ ∈ ΨR. Suppose that a : φ ∈ ΨL. Assume, by contradiction
that a : −φ /∈ ΨR. Consider the branch Γ′1 → ∆′1 · · ·Γ′n → ∆′n Γ′n → ∆′n, a : −φ using in
the last step the rule (NS). Observe that this branch is still analytical. Indeed a : −φ
does not occur in (iR)n and no fresh variables are involved. Hence we get a contradiction
since the given branch is analytical and exhausted.
11. If t1 ∼= t2, a : −(t1 · p) ∈ ΨR then a : t2 · p ∈ ΨR. The proof is similar to one of (10).
12. If a : φ ∈ ΨR then, there is a′ ∈ X ′A such that aEvar(φ) a′, a′ : −φ ∈ ΨL. Assume that
a : φ ∈ ΨR. Suppose, by contradiction, that for every a′ ∈ X ′A either aEvar(φ) a′ /∈ ΨL
or a′ : −φ /∈ ΨL. In both cases, rule (SCR) was not applied to a : φ. Then a : φ is in
∆′n. Consider the branch Γ′1 → ∆′1 · · ·Γ′n → ∆′n aEvar(φ) b, b : −φ,Γ′n → (∆′n \{a : φ})
using in the last step the rule (SCR) where b is not in Γ′n ∪ ∆′n. Observe that this
branch is still analytical. So the original branch is not exhausted which contradicts the
hypothesis.
13. If a : φ ∈ ΨL then, for each a′ ∈ X ′A either a Evar(φ) a′ ∈ ΨR or a′ : −φ ∈ ΨR.
Assume that a : φ ∈ ΨL. Suppose, by contradiction, that there is a′ ∈ X ′A such that
aEvar(φ) a′ /∈ ΨR and a′ : −φ /∈ ΨR. Observe that a : φ is in Γ′n. Consider the branch
Γ′1 → ∆′1 · · ·Γ′n → ∆′n Γ′n → ∆′n, a Evar(φ) a′ using in the last step the rule (SCL).
Observe that this branch is still analytical. So the original branch is not exhausted
which contradicts the hypothesis.
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14. If φ ∈ ΨR then either there exists a′ ∈ X ′A such that a′ : −φ, a′ : −φ ∈ ΨL or for
each a ∈ X ′A either a : φ ∈ ΨR or a : φ ∈ ΨR. Suppose that φ ∈ ΨR. Assume,
by contradiction, that the thesis does not hold. Then, φ ∈ ∆′n since rule (SKR) was
not applied to φ in the branch. Consider the branch Γ′1 → ∆′1 · · ·Γ′n → ∆′n b : −φ, b :−φ,Γ′n → ∆′n using in the last step the rule (SKR) where b is not in Γ′n ∪ ∆′n.
Observe that this branch is still analytical. So the original branch is not exhausted
which contradicts the hypothesis.
15. If φ ∈ ΨL then there is a′ ∈ X ′A such that a′ : φ, a′ : φ ∈ ΨL and for each a ∈ X ′A either
a : −φ ∈ ΨR or a : −φ ∈ ΨR. Assume that φ ∈ ΨL. Suppose, by contradiction and
with no loss of generality, that for every a′ ∈ X ′A, either a′ : φ /∈ ΨL or a′ : φ /∈ ΨL.
Then rule (KL) was not applied in the branch to φ. Hence, φ is in Γ′n. Consider the
branch Γ′1 → ∆′1 · · ·Γ′n → ∆′n b : φ, b : φ,Γ′n → ∆′n using in the last step the rule (KL)
where b is not in Γ′n ∪∆′n. Observe that this branch is still analytical. So the original
branch is not exhausted which contradicts the hypothesis.
16. If a :: (φ1, . . . , φn/φ) ∈ ΨR then if φ1, . . . , φn ∈ ΨL then a : φ ∈ ΨR. Assume that
a :: (φ1, . . . , φn/φ) ∈ ΨR and φ1, . . . , φn ∈ ΨL. Assume, by contradiction, that a :
φ /∈ ΨR. Then rule (CR1) was not applied in the branch to a :: (φ1, . . . , φn/φ). Hence,
a :: (φ1, . . . , φn/φ) is in ∆
′
n. Consider the branch Γ
′
1 → ∆′1 · · ·Γ′n → ∆′n φ1, . . . , φn,Γ′n →
∆′n, a : φ using in the last step the rule (CR1). Observe that this branch is still analyt-
ical. So the original branch is not exhausted which contradicts the hypothesis.
17. If a :: (φ1, . . . , φn/φ) ∈ ΨL then either φi ∈ ΨR for some i = 1, . . . , n or a : φ ∈ ΨL.
Suppose that a :: (φ1, . . . , φn/φ) ∈ ΨL. Assume, by contradiction, that φi /∈ ΨR
for every i = 1, . . . , n and a : φ /∈ ΨL. Then rule (CR2) was not applied in the
branch to a :: (φ1, . . . , φn/φ). Hence, a :: (φ1, . . . , φn/φ) is in Γ
′
n. Consider the branch
Γ′1 → ∆′1 · · ·Γ′n → ∆′n Γ′n → ∆′n, φ1 using in the last step the rule (CR2). Observe that
this branch is still analytical. So the original branch is not exhausted which contradicts
the hypothesis.
QED
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